The Supreme Court of India has ruled that the constitutional requirement to produce an arrested person before a magistrate within 24 hours begins from the moment the person's liberty is effectively curtailed through detention, and not from the time the investigating agency formally records the arrest.
A Bench of Justices Ujjal Bhuyan and Atul S Chandurkar held that detention cannot be treated as a separate period preceding formal arrest to circumvent the safeguards guaranteed under Article 22(2) of the Constitution. If a person remains in custody for more than 24 hours without being produced before a magistrate, excluding only the time necessary for the journey to the court, the continued detention becomes illegal and the person must be released.
The ruling was delivered in Sujit Das v. Union of India, a case involving four persons accused in a drug-smuggling investigation. They were detained during a search and seizure operation at 2 pm on September 29, 2025, but their formal arrest was recorded only on September 30.
The accused argued that the investigating agency had deliberately delayed recording their arrest to avoid the constitutional deadline. The agency, on the other hand, maintained that the 24-hour period began only when the formal arrest was recorded.
Rejecting this interpretation, the Supreme Court held that the constitutional protection could not be defeated by drawing a distinction between detention and formal arrest.
"Clause (2) of Article 22 does not sanction creation of a zone where the liberty of an individual is curtailed for investigative purposes but not formally shown as arrested. Creation or contemplation of such a buffer zone is unconstitutional," the Bench observed.
The Court emphasised that any artificial distinction between detention before formal arrest and the period following it would undermine the fundamental protection guaranteed by the Constitution.
"The Constitution does not recognise any detention divorced from arrest," the Bench said, adding that the 24-hour period begins when a person suspected of committing an offence is taken into custody and their liberty is effectively curtailed. For the purpose of Article 22(2), the expressions 'arrested' and 'detained' must be understood as synonymous.
It further held that the only period that can be excluded while calculating the 24-hour deadline is the time necessary for travelling from the place of arrest to the magistrate's court. Time spent on investigation, interrogation, search or seizure before formal arrest cannot be excluded.
The Court also highlighted the importance of these constitutional safeguards in preventing custodial violence and abuse of investigative powers. It noted that violations of human rights frequently occur during investigations, when police resort to coercive methods to extract information or confessions.
"Custodial violence is an unfortunate reality of our country and is judicially acknowledged," the Bench observed, referring to practices such as screening arrests, failing to formally record arrests or describing the deprivation of liberty as prolonged interrogation.
The Court said constitutional protections must operate from the moment a person is intercepted and detained by investigating authorities. Allowing an investigative period outside the scope of Article 22(2) would create opportunities for abuse without judicial oversight.
Applying these principles, the Bench found that the accused had been under the control and custody of the search team from 2 pm on September 29, 2025. They should consequently have been produced before a judicial magistrate by 2 pm on September 30. However, they were produced only at 4.45 pm that day.
The Court held that this amounted to a clear violation of Article 22(2), making their continued detention beyond the constitutional deadline illegal and unconstitutional.
The Bench also examined Section 58 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), which prohibits detention beyond a reasonable period without production before a magistrate, subject to the statutory and constitutional requirements.
It noted that there was an unexplained gap of 18 hours between the conclusion of the search and seizure proceedings and the formal recording of the arrest. The investigating agency had provided no justification for keeping the accused in custody during this period.
The Court held that 18 hours without judicial oversight could not be considered reasonable, particularly given the possibility of misuse of authority. It concluded that the detention also violated Section 58 of the BNSS and that the accused were entitled to immediate release.
"The arrest of the appellants for the purpose of Article 22(2) would be construed to have taken place at 2 PM on September 29, 2025, when they were under the control and custody of the search team," the Bench said.
The Supreme Court accordingly set aside the Tripura High Court's April 29 order refusing bail to the accused. The case involved the alleged recovery of 11.03 kilograms of methamphetamine tablets, commonly known as yaba.
Earlier High Court Rulings Disapproved
The Supreme Court also considered conflicting interpretations of the 24-hour constitutional deadline by various High Courts.
It disapproved the earlier rulings in Aryaman Pattanaik (Orissa High Court), Kannan (Madras High Court) and Arun K Thomas (Kerala High Court), holding that their interpretation of Article 22(2), which permitted the period of detention before formal arrest to be excluded while calculating the 24-hour deadline, did not lay down the correct position of law.
At the same time, the Bench approved the approach adopted by the Kerala High Court in Biswajith Manda case, which had held that the 24-hour period begins when a person's liberty is effectively curtailed and not merely when the investigating agency formally records the arrest.
The Supreme Court's interpretation reinforces the principle that constitutional safeguards cannot be suspended during an investigative period simply because the investigating agency has not formally recorded an arrest.
NDPS Bail Restrictions Cannot Override Fundamental Rights
The judgment also addressed the relationship between constitutional protections and the stringent bail conditions under Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act).
The Bench reiterated that the restrictions imposed by Section 37 cannot override the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution. It observed that the right to life and personal liberty remains central to constitutional jurisprudence and cannot be diluted by provisions of a special statute.
The Court said that where a violation of Article 21 is established, the restrictions imposed by Section 37 of the NDPS Act or similar provisions under special legislation must give way to constitutional protections.
"The rights conferred by Article 21 of the Constitution are not only constitutional rights; these are fundamental rights. The right to life and liberty as enshrined in Article 21 is at the core of our constitutional jurisprudence," the Bench observed.
It further clarified that legislation, whether general or special, cannot determine how constitutional rights are to be interpreted. Instead, statutory provisions must be understood in a manner consistent with the Constitution.
The Bench also expressed reservations about certain observations in State of Punjab v. Sukhwinder Singh @ Gora concerning Article 21 and Section 37 of the NDPS Act. However, it stopped short of deciding the correctness of that earlier decision by a coordinate Bench.
The ruling reiterates that the protection of personal liberty cannot be made dependent on the formalities followed by investigating agencies. The constitutional obligation to produce a detained person before a magistrate within 24 hours begins when their freedom is effectively curtailed, ensuring that investigative powers remain subject to judicial oversight.
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